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THE RISE AND GRADUAL FALL OF THE LOCALITY RULE
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
JON R. WALTZ*
HE LAW'S mill usually grinds slowly. It turns out, often after the
passage of much time, a rule that more or less fits the circum-
stances of the time, or at least of a time only recently gone by,
and then-as though it had accomplished its task to perfection and
for all time-it may grind to a halt. Until the mill is made to grind
again, the law is said to be "certain." This results in a sort of schizo-
phrenic existence for lawyers, who by and large control the levers on
the mill, for it is said that they have pigeonhole minds and regard
certainty in the law as a positive good. However, the lawyer's business is
the representation not of his own interests but of the interests of others.
One lawyer will thus advocate the certainty that presently exists, for
it favors his side of a litigated matter; but his adversary will advocate
a certainty yet to come, since a new rule would favor the interests that
he commonly represents. And so, although lawyers may seek certitude
in their contending efforts, they make absolutely certain that the law
will never have it. The only thing certain about the law is its long-run
uncertainty; it is, as the late Felix Frankfurter once remarked, neither
fixed nor finished. Lawyers, along with such philosophers as Alfred
North Whitehead, know that one art of a free society consists in fear-
lessness of legal revision, to secure that law which serves those pur-
poses which satisfy an enlightened reason. Lawyers, when the right
time comes, are adept at reactivating the mill in order to produce
necessary legal revisions.
This process, which I hope I have not described in too pretentious
a fashion, can be discerned in the history of a significant legal rule
applicable to medical malpractice litigation-the so-called "locality
rule." The law's formulation of the generalized standard of care gov-
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THE LOCALITY RULE
erning the physician and surgeon is full of formulae and phrases which,
as Justice Holmes observed in another connection, "by their very
felicity delay further analysis." The locality rule, tacked on at the end
of the generalized standard, is one of these. The law states that a medical
man has the obligation to his patient to possess and employ such rea-
sonable skill and care as is commonly had and exercised by reputable,
average physicians in the same general system or school of practice
in the same or similar locality.' On a practical level, the locality rule
has influenced not only the professional standards demanded of med-
ical men but also the availability of witnesses to establish the physi-
cians' culpable deviation from those standards.
The plaintiff in all but the most self-evident medical malpractice
case is required to produce in support of his claim the testimony of
qualified medical experts.2 This is true because the technical aspects of
his'claim will ordinarily be far beyond the competence of the lay jurors
whose duty it is to assess the defendant doctor's conduct. And the
plaintiff himself, lacking the training and experience that would qual-
ify him to characterize the defendant's conduct, is incompetent to
supply guidance to the jurors. Turning back to the generalized standard
of care applicable to the medical doctor, we find an apparent insistence
that the physician's performance conform to practices acceptable in
his locality or, if his community provides no comparison, in similar
localities. This curiously narrow element of the standard of care sets
up an important qualification affecting the sort of medical witness who
1 See, e.g., Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938) ; Nelson
v. Nicollett Clinic, 201 Minn. 505, 509, 276 N.W. 801, 803 (1937); Loudon v. Scott, 58
Mont. 645, 654, 194 P. 488, 491 (1920). See also McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558-60 (1959).
The term "average" is employed in the sense of "ordinary" learning and skill; a true
"average" would involve an uneasy aggregation of the best and the worst, the experienced
and the inexperienced, the quack and the specializing medical doctor. It has never been
suggested that the law strikes the average from so diverse a grouping. See, e.g., Sim v.
Weeks, 7 Cal. App. 2d 28, 45 P.2d 350 (1935); Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E.
832 (1886); Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629, 66 N.W. 894 (1896).
2 See, e.g., Phillips v. Stillwell, 55 Ariz. 147, 99 P.2d 104 (1940); Hogmire v. Voita, 319
Ill. App. 644, 49 N.E.2d 811 (1943); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, Inc., 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.
W.2d 108 (1945). See generally Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of
Negligence Issues, 26 TExAs L. Rav. 1 (1947). In genuinely self-evident cases, such as
those in which sponges or items of hardware were left within the situs of operation, the
res ipsa loquitur principle will avoid the necessity of expertise. See, e.g., Graham v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 46 Il. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258
Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966). See also Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases, 60 Nw. U. L. R~v. 852 (1966).
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is free to testify in a malpractice action. The medical expert must be
shown to be conversant with the methods, procedures, and treatments
commonly utilized in the locality in which the defendant doctor prac-
tices. Short of that, he must at least be familiar with acceptable
practices in geographic areas sufficiently similar to the defendant's to
serve as a fair and adequate guide.
The plain fact is that the locality rule possessed a semblance of
certainty for only a short time. It has been put -through the mill, so to
speak, and has in the process been significantly revised and refined.
Moreover, it is about to disappear almost completely. Felicity of
phraseology and the cumbersome nature of the law's machinery has
slowed, but not halted, perceptive analysis of the locality rule.
ORIGINAL FORMULATION OF THE LOCALITY RULE
The locality rule was a product of the United States;I the English
courts never developed such a principle.4 In its original formulation,
which took shape in the late nineteenth century, the locality rule liter-
ally demanded that a medical expert testifying for the plaintiff in a
malpractice action must have practiced in the defendant's community.'
The rule, in its early form, was demonstrably calculated to protect the
rural and small town practitioner, who was presumed to be less ade-
quately informed and equipped than his big city brother. As was noted
in Small v. Howard, a case involving a general practitioner in a village
of 2,500, the defendant "was not bound to possess that high degree of
art and skill possessed by eminent surgeons practicing in larger cities." 6
3 For three of the earlest formulations of the rule, see Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286
(1872); Tefit v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870); and Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557 (1876).
4 See NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 21 (1957).
5 See, e.g., Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893) ; Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky.
20, 69 S.W. 1096 (1902). Surprisingly, a few recent decisions adhere to this early and most
restrictive formulation. See, e.g., Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955);
Lockhart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961); Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash.
2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956). The Huttner case, involving an especially myopic application
of the locality rule, is impliedly ovreruled by Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973
(Wash. 1967), to be discussed later in this article.
6 128 MAss. 131, 132, 35 Am. R. 363, 365 (1880). See also Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa
286 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870); cf. Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d
505, 510 (Mo. 1958). Consideration for the "isolated" practitioner has lingering force. See,
e.g., Stallcup v. Coscarat, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955) (Phoenix, Arizona oral
surgeon; misguided decision); Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174
(1948) (where general practitioner in small Maine town 130 miles from hospital and lab-
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This early locality rule was an expedient principle. Although case opin-
ions are short on supporting data, courts one hundred years ago were
probably justified in adopting a presumption that the large city prac-
titioner enjoyed broader experience than his country cousin and greater
access to the latest medical knowledge and to the most advanced and
elaborate facilities and equipment. If plaintiff's expert did not come
from the defendant's town, he did not have the proper experience for
testifying against the defendant: the witness and the defendant func-
tioned in different worlds.
EXPANSION OF THE RULE TO INCLUDE SIMILAR LOCALITIES
The early and most restrictive form of the locality rule was soon
relaxed in many jurisdictions,' if only because it posed a predictable
problem. It effectively immunized from malpractice liability any doctor
who happened to be the sole practitioner in his community. He could
be treating bone fractures by the application of wet grape leaves and
yet remain beyond the criticism of more enlightened practitioners from
other communities.
Instead of a "same locality" rule, today the law usually applies a
"same or similar" locality rule.8 Furthermore, the definition of "locality"
may be an expansive one. In a 1916 case, involving practitioners in a
small village, the Minnesota Supreme Court, fifty years ahead of its
time, suggested that the relevant locality was the entire state.' To this
day few courts have expressly gone so far, but it is clear that the current
stress is on similarity of locality and medical practice rather than on
geographical proximity. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court in 1950
allowed testimony by physicians from Evanston, Illinois against physi-
oratory facilities treated a rare disease). Cf. Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d
639 (1952) (where plaintiff, in action against St. Paul practitioner, relied on experts from
Mayo Clinic at Rochester; the court warned that their level of skili was not conclusive).
7 See, e.g., Pelky v. Palmer, 109 Mich. 561, 67 N.W. 561 (1896) ; McCracken v. Smathers,
122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898); Bigney v. Fisher, 26 R.I. 402, 59 A. 72 (1904).
8 See, e.g., Weintraub v. Rosen, 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Lewis v. Johnson, 12 Cal.
2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939) ; Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1956) ; Kirchner
v. Dorsey, 226 Iowa 283, 284 N.W. 171 (1939); Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d
338 (1939); Stafford v. Hunter, 66 Wash. 2d 269, 401 P.2d 986 (1965). For significant
statutory changes in the rule, see GA. CODE § 84-924 (1955) (as interpreted in, e.g., Murphy
v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965)) and Wis. STAT. § 147.14(2)(a)
(1961).
9 Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
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cians practicing in Davenport, Iowa. 10 The court concluded that the
practice in and around Chicago was essentially comparable to the
practice in Davenport. In a still more recent case, a Florida appellate
court was adverting to the locality rule when it commented that "Miami
is at least a community similar to West Palm Beach."'" It concluded
that plaintiff's witness, "though from Miami, was a competent medical
expert on the ordinary care required of a doctor in West Palm
Beach .. , 12 In a Washington case, the state's supreme court upheld
the receipt in evidence of expert testimony from a Portland, Oregon
doctor in a malpractice action that arose in Longview, Washington,
50 miles away. 3 The two communities were hardly similar, but the
court perceived that this circumstance and the geographic facts were
virtually irrelevant because the Portland doctor had testified that he
was familiar with the standards of medical practice in Longview. 4
The Supreme Court of California settled California "locality" law
after two appellate courts went off in seemingly different directions.
In Warnock v. Kraft, the lower court approved the admission of testi-
mony by Los Angeles doctors in a malpractice suit against a Pasadena
surgeon. 5 The decision was a logical result; Los Angeles was a larger
city than Pasadena, but they were both in the same county and, at the
time, shared the same general hospital. However, two years after
Warnock another California appellate court, in McNamara v. Emmons,
rejected testimony from San Bernardino doctors in a malpractice action
against an Ontario physician. (The two communities were in geographic
proximity, but San Bernardino had a population of 50,000 while
Ontario's was 15,000.)16
Subsequently, nine years after McNamara, the California Supreme
Court, in Sinz v. Owens, reached a somewhat timid compromise.' 7
'OMcGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950).
11 Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312, 316 (Fla. App. 1962).
12 Id. at 317.
13 Teig v. St. John's Hospital, 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
14 See also Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53, 57 (10th Cir. 1964), in which a San Francisco
practitioner was permitted to testify against a physician practicing in a small Utah town
after having testified that, ". . . through his experience, reading, lectures and travels
[he] was familiar with the practice in small towns throughout the United States with
regard to the treatment of ... fractures [of the type involved in the case]."
15 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P.2d 505 (1938).
16 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (1940).
17 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
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Plaintiff Sinz had charged the defendant general practitioner with
malpractice in his treatment of a double comminuted leg fracture. An
expert called by the plaintiff testified that "the standard practice in
California" was to use skeletal traction in double comminuted fracture
cases, a procedure that had been omitted by the defendant physician. 8
A verdict for plaintiff resulted. On appeal the defendant contended that
plaintiff's expert had not been properly qualified to testify. The con-
tention pushed the locality rule to something of an extreme, since the
community from which plaintiff's expert hailed was smaller than the
town in which the defendant practiced. The California Supreme Court,
rejecting defendant's argument, stated: "The essential factor is knowl-
edge of similarity of conditions; geographical proximity is only one
factor to be considered." 9 But the court insisted that plaintiff's con-
tention that the entire San Joaquin Valley was the relevant geographic
area was "beyond permissible bounds.1 20 Dissenting, one justice as-
serted that, "the qualifications of a physician and surgeon to practice
in California does [sic] not depend upon the locality in which he is
engaged in practice, but upon the education and training which he has
received in institutions in which the method and scope of instruction
and the technique in training are substantially uniform. '' 21 The dis-
senting judge would have held that a physician licensed to practice
medicine in California was qualified to testify as an expert in any part
of the state. The level of equipment and facilities available to the
defendant in his particular locality would simply be a factor which
the jurors could take into account in assessing the propriety of his
conduct.
The dissenting justice in Sinz partially comprehended the real rea-
sons for a lessening of the locality rule's rigidity. These reasons are to
be found in nationwide advances in medical training and improvement
in communications and transportation. Today's doctor begins his
practice, wherever it may be, with a stronger base of training than
was generally true in the late nineteenth century. The proliferation of
medical literature, attendance at seminars and conferences, and rea-
sonably speedy mail service enhances and updates the knowledge of
18 Id. at 752, 205 P.2d at 4.
19 Id. at 756, 205 P.2d at 7.
20 Id. at 755, 205 P.2d at 6.
21 Id. at 767, 205 P.2d at 13.
1969]
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practitioners in small communities as well as large. The Supreme Court
of Florida, in dicta, recognized this reality:
This rule [i.e., the locality rule] was originally formulated when communications
were slow or virtually non-existent, and ...it has lost much of its significance
today with the increasing number and excellence of medical schools, the free
interchange of scientific information, and the consequent tendency to harmonize
medical standards throughout the country.22
That the Florida court's suggestion is realistic is further demonstrated
by Louisell's and Williams' more complete listing of the modern day
doctor's learning aids, which include:
The comprehensive coverage of the Journal of the American Medical Association,
the availability of numerous other journals, the ubiquitous "detail men" of the drug
companies, closed circuit television presentations of medical subjects, special radio
networks for physicians, tape recorded digests of medical literature, and hundreds
of widely available postgraduate courses.23
Eight years ago, when the list was compiled, Louisell and Williams
insisted that the medical profession was then rapidly establishing
nationwide standards of proficiency and that, "Medicine realizes this,
so it is inevitable that the law will do likewise.1
24
Furthermore, in an era of fast transportation it may be proper prac-
tice in the smallest and most remote community to send a patient with
a complex malady to a specialist in a metropolitan area that has better
medical facilities. In Tvedt v. Haugen, a North Dakota court, refusing
to limit the pertinent locality to a small town, said:
Today, with rapid methods of transportation and easy means of communication,
the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by
utilizing the means at hand in the particular village where he is practicing. So far
as medical treatment is concerned, the borders of the locality or community have,
in effect, been extended so as to include those centers readily accessible where
appropriate treatment may be had which the local physician, because of limited
facilities or training, is unable to give.2 5
The quoted language states a double-barrelled proposition: (1) accept-
able practice in an ill-equipped community may involve sending the
patient to an accessible metropolitan area for treatment if time permits;
22 Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
23 LOUISELL & WILLIA.S, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 183 (1960). See also Kolesar v.
United States, 198 F. Supp. 517, 521 (S.D. Fla. 1961) ; Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438 P.2d
829, 837 (Wash. 1968).
24 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 23.
25 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188 (1940).
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and, (2) a physician from a metropolitan area might be allowed to
testify against a rural practitioner regarding an applicable procedure.
The former has to do with the physician's standard of care, while the
latter has to do with the sort of expert who can testify to it.
The modern view of a majority of courts is that a medical expert is
free to testify in a malpractice case if his community or other com-
munities with which he is familiar bear sufficient similarity to that of
the defendant. And in determining similarity the courts will not now
look to such socio-economic facts as population, type of economy, and
income level but to factors more directly relating to the practice of
medicine. In the main, an expert practicing in a locality having medical
facilities comparable to those existing in the defendant's community is
permitted to testify concerning the standard of care governing the de-
fendant. The number and quality of hospitals, laboratories and medical
schools are typical considerations. Of course, the nature of the com-
munity in which the witness currently practices is irrelevant if he
happens also to possess familiarity with standards in the defendant's
locale or in areas sufficiently similar to it. The law has focused on the
witness' place of practice on the assumption that a medical man will
be knowledgeable only about standards in his immediate vicinity, but
this assumption is not invariably valid.26
THE IMPENDING DISAPPEARANCE OF THE LOCALITY RULE
It is safe prognostication of the law's future direction to say that
the locality rule, long in the process of shrinking, will gradually dis-
appear almost completely. Four years ago, Dean Prosser discerned a
"tendency.. .to abandon any such formula [i.e., the locality rule], and
[to] treat the size and character of the community, in instructing the
jury, as merely one factor to be taken into account in applying the
general professional standard."27 Cases are beginning to bear out Pros-
ser's observation. In the 1968 case of Brune v. Belinko f, 28 Massachu-
26 See, e.g., Riley v. Layton, supra note 14; Teig v. St. John's Hospital, supra note 13;
and text at supra note 14.
27 PROSSER, ToRTs 166-67 (3d ed. 1964).
28235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968). See also, e.g., McGulpin v. Bessmer, supra note 10;
Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931);Carbone v. Warburton, 11
N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956);
Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
This abandonment of the locality rule stems from the fact that the practice of medi-
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setts' Supreme Judicial Court announced that it is abandoning the last
vestiges of the locality rule. The sweep of this statement is limited
only by the fact that Brune involved as the defendant a medical
specialist, and it is arguable that the locality rule has long since lost
vitality in specialist cases.
The Brune case involved an action against a specialist in anesthe-
siology to recover for injuries caused by his alleged negligence in ad-
ministering an excessive injection of spinal anesthetic (pontocaine)
when the plaintiff gave birth to a baby in a New Bedford, Massachusetts
hospital. The defendant practiced in New Bedford, a city of 100,000
population, slightly more than 50 miles from Boston. Plaintiff com-
plained of persistent post-delivery numbness and weakness in her left
leg. The evidence showed that the anesthetic given her contained
eight milligrams of pontocaine in one cubic centimeter of ten percent
glucose solution. Plaintiff's evidence also tended to prove that good
medical practice called for a dosage of five milligrams or less. Defen-
dant's evidence, including his own testimony, revealed that an eight
milligram dosage was customary in New Bedford in vaginal deliveries.
The plaintiff objected to the trial judge's giving to the jury the
following instruction on the governing law:
[The defendant] must measure up to the standard of professional care and skill
ordinarily possessed by others in his profession in the community, which is New
Bedford, and its environs, of course, where he practices, having regard to the
current state of advance of the profession. If, in a given case, it were determined
by a jury that the ability and skill of the physician in New Bedford were fifty
percent inferior to that which existed in Boston, a defendant in New Bedford
would be required to measure up to the standard of skill and competence and
ability that is ordinarily found by physicians in New Bedford.29
The jury in Brune found for the defendant anesthesiologist, and the
plaintiff appealed, winning a reversal and a new trial. The core of
the higher court's reasoning is found in the following portions of its
opinion:
We are of the opinion that the "locality" rule . .. which measures a physician's
conduct by the standards of other doctors in similar communities, is unsuited to
present day conditions. The time has come when the medical profession should no
cine by certified specialists within each of the American Medical Association's nineteen
specialty branches is, obviously, substantially similar throughout the country. See Com-
ment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834, 838-39 (1965);
Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 887-88 (1962).
29 Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Mass. 1968). This charge to the jury was a
typical expression of the locality rule as it pertains to the standard of care.
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longer be Balkanized by the application of varying geographic standards in
malpractice cases.... The present case affords a good illustration of the inappro-
priateness of the "locality" rule to existing conditions.8 0
the court observed that New Bedford was close to Boston, "one of
the medical centers of the nation, if not the world," and that a practi-
tioner in New Bedford was "a far cry from the country doctor."'" The
trial judge, said the court, may well have carried the locality rule to
its logical conclusion, "but it is, we submit, a reductio ad absurdum of
the rule.132 The court went on to expound what it viewed as the proper
approach:
The proper standard is whether the physician, if a general practitioner, has
exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking
into account the advances in the profession. In applying this standard it is per-
missible to consider the medical resources available to the physician as one
circumstance in determining the skill and care required. Under this standard some
allowance is thus made for the type of community in which the physician carries
on his practice .... One holding himself out as a specialist should be held to the
standard of skill of the average member of the profession practicing the specialty,
taking into account the advances in the profession. And, as in the case of the general
practitioner, it is permissible to consider the medical resources available to him.s 3
There were harbingers of Brune in a 1967 Washington case. Pederson
v. Dumouchel involved a malpractice action against an Aberdeen,
Washington medical doctor, dentist, and hospital in which the trial
court had charged the jury that the standard of care applicable to the
defendants "was set by the learning, skill, care and diligence ordi-
narily possessed and practiced by others in the same profession in
good standing, engaged in like practice, in the same locality or in similar
localities." 4 The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the locality
rule as a binding principle. It stated that, "local practice within geo-
graphic proximity is one, but not the only factor to be considered."'3 5
Pointing to expanded means for the dissemination of medical knowledge,
the court declared: "No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the
standard of care... to the practice or custom of a particular locality,
3Old. at 798.
31 Id.
82 Id.
33 Id.
34 431 P.2d 973, 976 (Wash. 1967). Accord, Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438 P.2d 829(Wash.
1968); Versteeg v. Mowery, 435 P.2d 540 (1967).
85 Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1967).
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a similar locality, or a geographic area. 3 But the court, seemingly
on the verge of adopting a nationwide standard, appeared to backtrack,
stating that the standard of care applicable to medical men is that
level of proficiency "established in an area coextensive with the med-
ical and professional means available in those centers that are readily
accessible for appropriate treatment of the patient." 7 It can be demon-
strated, however, that the Washington court's apparent hedging re-
flected a necessary exception to the concept of a national standard of
care in medical malpractice cases.3
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE Brune AND Pederson DECISIONS
The Brune and Pederson decisions herald an important shift at two
levels of the law of medical malpractice. At one level, the shift is in the
relevant standard of care. Brune suggests a nationwide standard for
both specialists and general practitioners: the general practitioner
must adhere to "the degree of care and skill of the average qualified
[general] practitioner. . .," while the specialist must adhere "to the
standard of skill of the average member of the profession practicing
the specialty. . . ."" Pederson is more cautious, and correctly so. By
holding the medical man to that degree of care and skill established
in areas accessible to him, the Washington court took into account the
possible unavailability in some cases of special facilities, equipment or
devices. It would not do to suggest that a physician could rationally
be found guilty of malpractice for failing to employ, for example, an
artificial kidney machine if that equipment were unavailable in his
community and not accessible elsewhere in time to save his patient's
life. If Brune is read to mean that the absolute unavailability of essen-
tial "medical resources" is merely a "permissible" consideration for
which a jury could make "some allowance," it goes too far. Such a
situation would constitute the basis not for "some allowance" but
rather for summary judgment or a directed verdict in favor of the de-
fendant doctor. The law of medical malpractice, akin with diplomacy,
36 Id.
871d.
38 That the basic teaching of Pederson is considered clear in Washington is attested by
Douglas v. Bussabarger, supra note 34, at 837-38, in which that state's Supreme Court,
citing Pederson, declared that, ". . . there is no longer any basis in fact for the 'locality
rule.'" See also Versteeg v. Mowery, supra note 34.
39 Supra note 29, at 798.
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is an aspect of the art of the possible. If, on the other hand, Brune is
read to mean that "some allowance" could properly be made where
essential resources were unavailable locally (e.g., in New Bedford)
but readily accessible elsewhere (e.g., in Boston, a fast 50 miles away),
it perhaps does not go far enough. In the latter situation it can rightly
be said, as a matter of law, that the defendant doctor had a duty to re-
move his patient to the accessible medical facility where crucial re-
sources and medical specialists were available. This proposition is the
inferential teaching of the more carefully worded Pederson opinion and
the express teaching of the forward-looking 1940 opinion in Tvedt v.
Haugen.4 ° Finally, putting aside cases involving crucial medical facil-
ities, equipment, devices, and the like, Brune and Pederson are con-
sistent. In cases involving general professional skill, uncomplicated by
any question of available special resources, both strongly suggest the
demise of the locality rule as binding consideration.
At a second level, the Brune and Pederson decisions are significant
precedents for malpractice claimants to seek their medical experts in
any geographic area in the United States, or perhaps even beyond, 41
so long as such experts are equipped to describe "the degree of care
and skill of the average qualified [general or specializing] practi-
tioner. ,4 2
CONCLUSION
The collapse of the locality rule is a welcome example of the law's
processes of self-refinement. If the rule were ever justifiable, it clearly
is not now. It is anomalous enough that in this area, unlike most, the
custom and practice of an occupational group conclusively determines
the applicable standard of care.4 1 It is more than merely anomalous
40 See text, at supra note 25. See also Simone v. Sabo, 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19
(1951) ; Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174 (1948) ; Derr v. Bonney, 38 Wash.
2d 678, 231 P.2d 637 (1951) ; Myers, The Surgeon, the General Practitioner, and Medical
Ethics, 45 BULL. AMER. COLL. OF SURGEONS 473, 500 (1960).
41 Cf. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., Inc., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941)
(German-trained physican witness who had not been practicing in the United States at
or before the time of defendant doctor's challenged conduct); Ramsland v. Shaw, 341
Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960) (proffer of English anesthesia treatise under Massachu-
setts statute permitting receipt in evidence of authoritative medical treatises).
4 2 Supra note 29, at 798.
43 The usual role assigned to custom and practice by the law of torts is evidentiary
only: "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought
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that so progressive a profession, with its unmatched educational facil-
ities, should not be held, in the law's eyes, to a uniform medical stan-
dard of care. One is compelled almost inexorably to the conclusion that
the locality rule's patchwork approach is more a child of the legal
profession than of the medical, a tactically advantageous principle to
be clung to apologetically by one segment of the trial bar until the
courts, sensing that it is no longer rooted in reality, take it away. Surely
there could be found today few physicians who would defend the notion
that their brothers in some parts of the country are, or should be per-
mitted to be, less competent than those in other regions, based not on
impermissibly variant education and training but on some inexpli-
cably depressing force of geography alone.
The locality rule has exerted two interrelated and unfortunate in-
fluences. It has rendered all the more shallow the pool of available ex-
pertise in legitimate malpractice litigation. And, at least in times past,
it has permitted geographic pockets of inferior health service to flour-
ish unchallenged for no better reason than that one or more less than
minimally proficient practitioners have been allowed, by the law's
default, to set the standard of a community. The fall of the locality
rule will exert pressure for uniformly adequate health services, a goal
to which both law and medicine are surely united.
The locality rule will pass unlamented by all but a handful of law-
yers and a few substandard medical practitioners. For some time the
medical specialist has neither had nor wanted the rule. The general
practitioner, whether in a large city or small town, must soon confront
a nationwide standard of competence. But nothing in what has been
said here suggests that the general practitioner must now conform to
standards set by medical specialists. The general practitioner must
adhere only to those minimum standards of unspecialized practice for
which his educational resources have equipped him. It is still good law
to say, as did Connecticut's highest court fifteen years ago, that, "A
country general practitioner should not be expected to use the high
degree of skill possessed by eminent surgeons living in large cities
specializing in various branches of medicine.""
to be done is fixed by a standard of prudence, whether it usually is complied with or
not." Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903). See also Morris, Custom
and Negligence, 42 CoLut. L. REv. 1147 (1942).
44Marchlewski v. Casella, 141 Conn. 377, 381, 106 A.2d 466, 468 (1954). See also,
e.g., Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1951); Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110
N.E.2d 337 (1953) ; Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957).
